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Whither (Wither?) the Unfinished Business
Doctrine
Douglas R. Richmond*
I. INTRODUCTION
Large law firms collapse with alarming frequency. In recent
years, for example, Altheimer & Gray LLP; Brobeck, Phleger
& Harrison LLP; Coudert Brothers LLP; Dewey & LeBoeuf
LLP; Heller Ehrman LLP; Howrey LLP; Thacher Proffitt & Wood
LLP; Thelen LLP; and Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen LLP
have folded. These high profile failures amply demonstrate the
extraordinary fragility of law firm partnerships.1
Law firm failures may be rooted in competitive pressures,
destabilizing internal dynamics, governance or leadership
failures, unsatisfactory or unsettling financial prospects or
performance, or some toxic combination thereof.2 These issues
drive major rainmaking partners to leave the firm, often taking
groups of productive lawyers with them. One key partner
departure leads to another and another, producing a
“self-reinforcing spiral of withdrawal” akin to a Depression-era
run on a bank.3 A law firm caught in such a “partner run” seldom
survives.4 Indeed, a firm may go from apparent financial health
to dissolution in a few months, and perhaps in even less time.5
Dissolving law firms typically have scores of open client
matters, many of which are far from completion. Litigation
matters may take years to conclude.6 Departing partners who

* Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Overland Park, Kansas. J.D.,
University of Kansas. Views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not
reflect the views of any Aon entity or client.
1 See John Morley, Why Law Firms Collapse 1–2 (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper
No. 521, 2015) (arguing that law firms are “uniquely fragile” and “are made of thin glass”).
2 See Edward S. Adams, Lessons from Law Firm Bankruptcies and Proposals for
Reform, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 507, 509–10 (2015) (exploring select major law firm
bankruptcies as a means of identifying common elements in their failures, including
economic turmoil, excessive growth and overcompensation, and toxic firm culture
and governance).
3 Morley, supra note 1, at 2.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 1–2.
6 ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 4.6.1, at 4:63–64 (2d ed. 2016).
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intend to continue practicing law often expect to take open client
matters with them to new firms. The law firms to which the
partners of the dissolved firm relocate are often vitally interested
in the dissolved firm’s active clients coming along.
At the same time, the dissolving law firm has landlords,
lenders, and other creditors to pay. The firm may have financial
obligations to retired partners. Pending client matters may be a
dissolving law firm’s only significant assets.7 If the law firm has
filed for bankruptcy protection, creditors and any trustee that is
appointed will strive to derive value from those assets for the
benefit of the bankruptcy estate.8 The result is frequently
litigation, in which a bankruptcy trustee or other administrator
sues the departing partners and the law firms to which they
relocate to collect fees earned on the dissolving firm’s “unfinished
business.”9 Unfinished business consists of “all matters in
progress which have not been completed at the time the firm
is dissolved.”10
The “unfinished business” doctrine reflects established
partnership law.11 In the law firm world, the unfinished business
doctrine is frequently referred to as the Jewel doctrine, or the
Jewel rule, after the seminal California case on the subject, Jewel
v. Boxer.12 Regardless of how it is described, the unfinished
business doctrine essentially holds that absent contrary
agreement, partners in a dissolved law firm must account to the
firm and its former partners either for all fees generated from
work in progress at the time of the firm’s dissolution, or for the
profits made on that work (depending on the state’s partnership

7 Christine Hurt, The Limited Liability Partnership in Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 567, 571 (2015).
8 See id. (“Though the partners of a law firm may have incentives to allow for easy
exit of themselves and other partners . . . trustees have incentives to retain those assets.
The larger the debt of the distressed firm, the more incentive the trustee has to assert
claims against financially well-off third party law firms that reaped the benefit of hourly
work for former clients of the debtor.”).
9 See John W. Edson, Comment, An Unworkable Result: Examining the Application
of the Unfinished Business Doctrine to Law Firm Bankruptcies, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
159, 161 (2015) (explaining that “trustees argue that any post-dissolution work derived
from client business started at the bankrupt firm is property of the bankrupt
firm’s estate”).
10 Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
11 Douglas R. Richmond, Migratory Law Partners and the Glue of Unfinished
Business, 39 N. KY. L. REV. 360, 420 (2012); see also Scott Fleischer, The “Unfinished
Business” Doctrine in Law Firm Bankruptcies, NASSAU LAWYER, Dec. 2014, at 7 (“The
‘unfinished business’ doctrine is not just rooted in one particular section of the UPA or
RUPA, but was developed through collective interpretations of many sections.”).
12 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). A thorough discussion of Jewel and its
progeny is beyond the scope of this article. For such a discussion, see Richmond, supra 11,
at 370–87.
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law) in accordance with their percentage interests in the firm.13
Pending client matters are uncompleted transactions that
require winding up after dissolution, and are therefore
partnership assets subject to post-dissolution distribution.14 As
the court in Gull v. Van Epps15 explained, “all partners of the
dissolved firm are generally entitled to share in fees for
pre-dissolution work in progress earned after dissolution, even if
the client has exercised [its] right to discharge the attorney or
attorneys who are sharing in the fees.”16 This entitlement exists
because dissolution does not terminate the firm’s pre-existing
contracts with its clients, so that partners who perform those
contracts do so as fiduciaries for the benefit of the
dissolved partnership.17
If partners of a dissolving law partnership stayed together
during the wind up of the firm’s business, the unfinished
business doctrine would be of no moment. But they do not—they
scatter to new law firms, taking open client matters with them.
The work they or their colleagues perform on those matters at
their new firms produces fees that their new firms wish to collect
and retain, and which they do not want to share with, or
surrender to, the dissolved firm. As noted earlier, this leaves an
administrator or trustee of the dissolved firm or its bankruptcy
estate to negotiate or sue for those fees under the unfinished
business doctrine. In this way the unfinished business doctrine
substitutes for the orderly winding up of partnership affairs by
the partners of the dissolved partnership.18
13 As explained in Part II, under the Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”), a partner,
other than a surviving partner, is not entitled to compensation for her services in winding
up the dissolved partnership’s affairs other than any sums she will receive for her share
in the partnership. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(f) (1914). Jewel was decided under
California’s version of the UPA. California later adopted the Revised Uniform Partnership
Act (“RUPA”). Most other states follow RUPA. Under RUPA, the unfinished business
doctrine has been modified to permit former partners to deduct overhead and reasonable
compensation before remitting to the dissolved partnership any monies earned from
completing unfinished business. See Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In
re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 326 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009)
(explaining California partnership law, which changed after Jewel was decided). This
allowance of compensation beyond any sums the former partner would receive for her
partnership share is often described as “extra compensation” or as “reasonable compensation,”
with the latter term being more accurate. Id. at 326 n.4.
14 See Young v. Delaney, 647 A.2d 784, 789 (D.C. 1994); Beckman v. Farmer, 579
A.2d 618, 636 (D.C. 1990).
15 Gull v. Van Epps, 517 N.W.2d 531 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
16 Id. at 536.
17 See In re LaBrum & Doak, LLP v. Ashdale, 227 B.R. 391, 409 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1998); Beckman, 579 A.2d at 636; Huber v. Etkin, 58 A.3d 772, 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
18 Courts have also applied the unfinished doctrine to dissolving law firms organized
as limited liability companies (“LLC”), professional associations, and professional
corporations. See, e.g., Vowell & Meelheim, P.C. v. Beddow, Erben & Bowen, P.A., 679 So.
2d 637, 640 (Ala. 1996) (involving a firm organized as a professional association);

Do Not Delete

286

6/20/17 7:13 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 20:2

When a large law firm dissolves, many of the open client
matters are billed by the hour. Despite increases in the use of
alternative fee structures, most lawyers in large law firms bill
hourly.19 Because the Jewel court upheld the unfinished business
doctrine in connection with contingent fees,20 partners in
dissolved large law firms resisting unfinished business claims
have frequently argued that courts should confine the doctrine to
contingent fee cases and should not apply it to hourly matters.21
For years that argument failed,22 as should have been expected,
because the Jewel court did not confine its holding to contingent
fee matters.23 Certainly, the unfinished business doctrine applies
to contingent fee cases24—but as a matter of partnership law it
should apply to other compensation arrangements, including
matters billed by the hour.25 Partnership law provides no basis
for treating client matters billed hourly as anything other than
the unfinished business of a dissolved law partnership. Indeed,
since Jewel was decided, California courts have applied the

Grossman v. Davis, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the
unfinished business doctrine applies to professional corporations); LaFond v. Sweeney,
343 P.3d 939, 945–49 (Colo. 2015) (applying the unfinished business doctrine in a case
involving a law firm organized as an LLC); Sullivan, Bodney & Hammond v. Bodney, 820
P.2d 1248, 1250 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (observing that the policy reasons supporting the
rule in Jewel applied to the dissolution of a professional corporation).
19 See Lucy Muzzy, Maximizing the Value of Outside Counsel, FED. LAW., Sept. 2013,
at 56, 58 (reporting that large law firms continue to earn approximately eighty percent of
their revenue from hourly billing).
20 Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
21 See, e.g., Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 572–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(recognizing, but ultimately rejecting, the argument that Jewel and its progeny apply only
to contingent fee cases and not to hourly fee matters).
22 See, e.g., Robinson v. Nussbaum, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–5 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing and
discussing Beckman v. Farmer, 579 A.2d 618, 641 (D.C. 1990)); Grossman, 34 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 356 (explaining that the unfinished business doctrine applies regardless of “the
nature of the compensation agreement with the client”); Rothman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
572–73 (“Neither Jewel nor [another case] explicitly states that it is concerned solely with
contingency fee cases . . . . Moreover, the policy reasons for the rule announced in Jewel . .
. apply with equal force to both contingency and hourly rate cases.”); see also Thomas E.
Rutledge & Tara A. McGuire, Conflicting Views as to the Unfinished Business Doctrine,
BUS. LAW TODAY, Feb. 2015, at 1 (observing that most courts and commentators have
applied the unfinished business doctrine to hourly matters as well as to contingent
fee cases).
23 Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 18–20.
24 See, e.g., LaFond v. Sweeney, 343 P.3d 939, 944–49 (Colo. 2015) (applying the
unfinished business doctrine to a contingent fee matter in the dissolution of a law firm
organized as an LLC); Huber v. Etkin, 58 A.3d 772, 780 (Pa. Super. 2012) (concluding that
“contingency fees realized post-dissolution are assets of the partnership”).
25 See Peter W. Rogers, Note, Who Gets the Jewels When a Law Firm Dissolves? The
Unfinished Business Doctrine and Hourly Matters, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 311, 336 (2013)
(“Because the unfinished business doctrine is a function of partnership law that upholds
fiduciary duties as a partnership winds up, the doctrine does not clash with . . . the UPA,
or RUPA, whether it is applied to matters billed by the hour or on contingency.”).
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unfinished business doctrine to matters billed by the hour,26 as
have courts in other jurisdictions.27
In 2014, however, two decisions from courts on opposite
coasts radically altered the unfinished business landscape by
rejecting its application to client matters that are billed by the
hour. The New York Court of Appeals held in Geron v. Seyfarth
Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP)28 that “pending hourly fee matters
are not ‘partnership property’ or ‘unfinished business’ within the
meaning of New York’s Partnership Law.”29 In re Thelen came to
the court on certified questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit30 after two Southern District of New York
courts predicting New York law reached opposite conclusions on
the unfinished business doctrine’s application to hourly matters
in cases arising out of separate large law firm bankruptcies.31
In Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP,32 a
California federal court reasoned that California law was
“unsettled on the question of whether a law firm may assert a
property interest in hourly fee matters pending at the time of its
dissolution,”33 and went on to hold that equity and public policy
weighed against application of the unfinished business doctrine
in that context.34 The trustee of the bankrupt law firm appealed
that decision to the Ninth Circuit, which in July 2016 certified
this question to the California Supreme Court: “Under California
law, does a dissolved law firm have a property interest in legal
matters that are in progress but not completed at the time the
law firm is dissolved, when the dissolved law firm had been
26 See, e.g., Rothman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573 (“[W]e hold that unfinished business
simply consists of all matters in progress which have not been completed at the time the
firm is dissolved. . . . That one matter is to be compensated at an hourly rate and another
on a contingency basis is of no consequence in determining whether a matter is
unfinished business.”) (citation omitted).
27 See, e.g., Robinson, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 4–6 (applying District of Columbia law).
28 See Geron v. Seyfarth (In re Thelen LLP), 20 N.E.3d 264 (N.Y. 2014).
29 Id. at 266–67.
30 Geron v. Seyfarth (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213, 225 (2d Cir. 2013) (certifying
questions in a case arising out of the Thelen LLP bankruptcy); In re Coudert Bros. LLP,
Nos. 12-4916(L) et al., 2013 WL 9363394, at *1–2 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2013) (certifying
questions in a case arising out of the Coudert Brothers LLP bankruptcy).
31 Compare Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 480
B.R. 145, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (concluding “that the New York Court of Appeals would, if
confronted with the issue, conclude that all client matters pending on the date of
dissolution are assets of the firm—regardless of how the firm was to be compensated for
the work”), rev’d in part, vacated in part by In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 574 F. App’x 15, 16
(2d Cir. 2014), with Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(concluding that “under New York law, a dissolved law firm's pending hourly fee matters
are not partnership assets”).
32 See Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, 527 B.R. 24 (N.D.
Cal. 2014).
33 Id. at 30.
34 Id. at 30–33.
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retained to handle the matters on an hourly basis?”35 The
California Supreme Court accepted the case and restated the
certified question as follows: “Under California law, what
interest, if any, does a dissolved law firm have in legal matters
that are in progress but not completed at the time the law firm is
dissolved, when the dissolved law firm had been retained to
handle the matter on an hourly basis?”36 The California Supreme
Court’s decision will determine the outcome in Heller Ehrman.37
This Article explains why In re Thelen and Heller Ehrman
were wrongly decided. To be sure, the unfinished business
doctrine sometimes produces results that lawyers find maddening.
The doctrine’s effects are particularly severe in Uniform
Partnership Act jurisdictions, as will be explained in the next
Part of this article. At a minimum, the doctrine potentially
complicates partners’ relocation from failed law firms to new
firms. But whatever its perceived flaws, the unfinished business
doctrine is an established aspect of partnership law that law
firms can contract around by inserting Jewel waivers in their
partnership agreements. The arguments that some commentators,
lawyers, and law firms have mounted against the doctrine to
date are unpersuasive. There is no compelling reason to except
law firms from the operation of a partnership law doctrine to
which all other partnerships are subject.
In explaining why the unfinished business doctrine should
be applied to matters billed by the hour, as it does to
representations in which lawyers are compensated by other
methods, we begin in Part II with a discussion of partnership law
principles.38 This includes an overview of partnership dissolution,
winding up, and termination, as well as an examination of
partners’ fiduciary duties post-dissolution. Part III analyzes In re
Thelen and Heller Ehrman in detail and explains why they are
incorrectly decided. Finally, Part IV dissects some of the leading
arguments that law firms have made in opposing the unfinished
business doctrine’s application.

35 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP (In re Heller Ehrman LLP),
830 F.3d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 2016).
36 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, No. S236208, 2016 Cal.
LEXIS 7131, at *1 (Cal. Aug. 31, 2016).
37 In re Heller Ehrman LLP, 830 F.3d at 973.
38 See generally Richmond, supra note 11, at 365–69, which was adapted for Parts
II.A and II.B. All text has been updated and remains the author’s original work.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION, WINDING UP,
AND TERMINATION
Partnerships are voluntary associations.39 They are also
creatures of contract.40 The relationships between partners and
their firm are generally governed by the terms of the partnership
agreement.41 A partnership agreement may be oral or written,42
and may also be inferred from parties’ conduct,43 although there
is obvious potential for confusion and uncertainty if the
agreement is not in writing. If there is no partnership agreement
or the agreement is silent on an issue, state partnership statutes
control.44 In other words, state partnership statutes primarily
provide default rules.45 Regardless, any partnership may
dissolve; there is no such thing as an “indissoluble partnership.”46
A.

Understanding Dissolution, Winding Up, and Termination
The Uniform Partnership Act of 1914 (“UPA”), long the
foundation for many states’ partnership laws and still employed
in some states, treats partnerships as aggregates of their
members rather than as distinct entities.47 The UPA defines
“dissolution” as “the change in the relation of the partners caused
by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on . . . of
the business.”48 Under the UPA approach, a partnership
dissolves any time a partner permanently leaves the firm, even if
the firm outwardly appears to continue.49 Again, this is a default
rule.50 Law firm partnerships in UPA states may avoid this
result by including in their partnership agreements (a) a

39 Loft v. Lapidus, 936 F.2d 633, 636 (1st Cir. 1991); Bunger v. Demming, 40 N.E.3d
887, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); Casey v. Chapman, 98 P.3d 1246, 1252 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
40 Husch & Eppenberger, v. Eisenberg, 213 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
41 See LESLIE D. CORWIN & ARTHUR J. CIAMPI, LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS
§ 1.05, at 1–30 (2008).
42 Legacy Seating v. Commercial Plastics, 65 F. Supp. 3d 542, 551–52 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(applying Illinois law); Young v. Delaney, 647 A.2d 784, 789 (D.C. 1994).
43 Cressy v. Proctor, 22 F. Supp. 3d 353, 360 (D. Vt. 2014) (discussing Vermont law).
44 See CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 41, § 1.05, at 1–30.
45 Husch & Eppenberger, 213 S.W.3d at 132; McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697, 703
(Mont. 2004); Ederer v. Gursky, 881 N.E.2d 204, 212 (N.Y. 2007); Bushard v. Reisman,
800 N.W.2d 373, 380 (Wis. 2011).
46 Fischer v. Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Ky. 2006); Urbane v. Beierling, 835
N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
47 See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 279 (3rd ed. 2001).
48 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 29 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1914).
49 HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.3.3, at 4:24. The remaining partners may choose to
continue the partnership business following the withdrawal of their peer. If so, “the old
firm continues until its affairs are wound up and a new partnership is formed, consisting
of the remaining members of the old partnership.” See also 8182 Md. Assocs., Ltd. P’ship
v. Sheehan, 14 S.W.3d 576, 580–81 (Mo. 2000). Any creditors of the old partnership
become creditors of the new partnership. Id. (citing a Missouri statute).
50 In re Popkin & Stern, 340 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying Missouri law).
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provision setting the term of the partnership;51 or (b) an
“anti-dissolution” or “continuation” provision differentiating
withdrawal from dissolution and recognizing the latter only upon
a partnership vote.52 The second of these options is common,
although its effectiveness is questionable, because “the inherent
power of any partner to dissolve a partnership, even in
contravention of an agreement, is a central tenet of the UPA.”53
In any event, a partnership agreement may include both types
of provisions.54
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”),55 which has
now been adopted in most states, differs from the UPA in several
key respects relevant to dissolution. RUPA establishes that a
partnership is an entity separate from its constituent partners.56
Like the UPA, RUPA grants partners the right to withdraw from
their partnerships at any time.57 Unlike the UPA, however,
under RUPA, a partner’s withdrawal does not necessarily cause
the partnership’s dissolution.58 RUPA distinguishes between
dissolution and withdrawal through the use of the term
“dissociation,” which denotes a partner’s withdrawal from a
partnership, whether voluntary or involuntary.59

51 HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.3.2.2, at 4:18. A provision in a partnership agreement
specifying a term of partnership does not actually prevent a partner from withdrawing
prematurely and thus causing the firm to dissolve. But such a premature dissolution is
considered wrongful, and the remaining partners may avoid winding up and continue the
business uninterrupted. Id. § 4.3.2.2, at 4:19.
52 Id. § 4.3.2.3, at 4:19.
53 Id. § 4.3.2.3, at 4:20–22 (footnote omitted); see also Eskenazi v. Schapiro, 812
N.Y.S.2d 474, 477 (App. Div. 2006) (discussing joint venturers’ and partners’ abilities to
repudiate a joint venture or partnership agreement at any time under the New York
Partnership Law).
54 See, e.g., In re Popkin & Stern, 340 F.3d at 711 (quoting the law firm’s
partnership agreement).
55 There is no official “Revised Uniform Partnership Act.” The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform Laws revised the UPA in 1994 and again in 1996, with the
1996 revisions subsequently published bearing a 1997 date. The 1994 and subsequent
revisions to the UPA came to be known as the “Revised Uniform Partnership Act.”
HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.1, at 4:2–3. The official name for what most lawyers call
RUPA is the “Uniform Partnership Act (1997).” GREGORY, supra note 47, at 262. To avoid
confusion, some courts refer to their states’ partnership acts by revision date. See, e.g.,
Faegre & Benson, LLP v. R & R Inv’rs, 772 N.W.2d 846, 852–53 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009)
(referring to “the 1994 UPA”).
56 ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201(a)
(2015–16 ed.) [hereinafter HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT] (“A partnership is
an entity distinct from its partners.”).
57 Compare UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 31(1)(b)(2) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1914) (discussing dissolutions caused both permissibly and wrongfully), with
HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 56, at § 602(a) (“A partner has the
power to dissociate at any time, rightfully or wrongfully, by express will . . . .”).
58 HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.4.2, at 4:46.
59 Id.
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Under both the UPA and RUPA, dissolution does not halt
partnership operations.60 Dissolution does not terminate the
partnership.61 “Dissolution” and “termination” are not
synonymous.62 Rather, the dissolved partnership enters a winding
up phase.63 “Winding up” is the time after dissolution and before
termination during which all partnership affairs are settled.64
Winding up a partnership generally “involves reducing the assets
to cash (liquidation), paying creditors, and distributing to
partners the value of their respective interests.”65 Winding up
may also include the prosecution of legal claims belonging to the
partnership.66 A law firm that is winding up will have to notify
its clients and perhaps withdraw from representations, and may
further be required to assist clients in securing new counsel.
Regardless of the specific tasks involved, winding up is a
dissolved partnership’s sole business or purpose.67
When the partnership is a large law firm, dissolution and
winding up are usually accomplished pursuant to a formal plan
of dissolution, and a firm may engage outside professionals, such
as accountants and lawyers, to assist it in winding up.68 There is
no prescribed time within which winding up must be
accomplished,69 although it should be completed within a

60 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 30 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1914)
(“On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the winding up of
partnership affairs is completed.”); HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note
56, § 802(a) (providing that after dissolution, a partnership continues for the sole purpose
of winding up its affairs and that the partnership is terminated when winding up
is completed).
61 Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890, 897 (Alaska 2004); Chaney v. Burdett, 560
S.E.2d 21, 22 (Ga. 2002); Hyta v. Finley, 53 P.3d 338, 340 (Idaho 2002); Lai v. Gartlan,
845 N.Y.S.2d 30, 36 (App. Div. 2007); Huber v. Etkin, 58 A.3d 772, 777 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2012).
62 Gast v. Peters, 671 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Neb. 2003); see also Scholastic, Inc. v. Harris,
259 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing New York law and stating that “[d]issolution is
not termination”); 8182 Md. Assocs., Ltd. P’ship v. Sheehan, 14 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Mo.
2000) (“Dissolution, however, is not a termination of the partnership business.”).
63 Hyta, 53 P.3d at 340; Hurwitz v. Padden, 581 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Minn. Ct. App.
1998); Lai, 845 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
64 GREGORY, supra note 47, § 227.
65 Estate of Matteson v. Matteson, 749 N.W.2d 557, 567 (Wis. 2008) (quoting First
Nat’l Bank of Kenosha v. Schaefer, 283 N.W.2d 410, 418 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979)); see also
Hyta, 53 P.3d at 340 (similarly describing the winding up process).
66 Faegre & Benson, LLP v. R & R Inv’rs, 772 N.W.2d 846, 853 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2009).
67 In re Jones & McClain, LLP, 271 B.R. 473, 478 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001); Fischer v.
Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Ky. 2006) (quoting the official commentary to the UPA);
Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. Ward & Olivo, L.L.P., 139 A.3d 30, 38 (N.J. 2016).
68 See CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 41, § 7.05[4], at 7–23 (offering a sample plan of
dissolution which, among its terms, provides for the retention of professionals to assist in
the winding up process).
69 Centerre Bank of Kan. City, N.A. v. Angle, 976 S.W.2d 608, 618 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998).
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reasonable time.70 Law firm wind-ups may drag on because they
involve bringing to a close all matters pending at the time of
dissolution, and litigation matters may take months and even
years to resolve.71 However long winding up may take, the
partnership terminates only when the process is complete.72
The UPA and RUPA take quite different approaches to
compensating partners for time spent completing a dissolved
partnership’s unfinished business. Under the UPA, a partner,
other than a surviving partner,73 is entitled to no extra
compensation for her services in winding up the dissolved
partnership’s affairs.74 “Extra compensation” refers to compensation
greater than any sum the partner will receive as her share of the
partnership.75 The refusal to allow extra compensation is sometimes
described as the “no compensation rule.”76 In contrast, under RUPA,
partners are entitled to reasonable compensation for their services
in winding up the dissolved partnership, plus the reimbursement of
related overhead.77
Law firms that do not want their partners to confront the
unfinished business doctrine in the event the firm dissolves may
avoid that prospect by including so-called “Jewel waivers” in

70 Daniels Trucking, Inc. v. Rogers, 643 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); Doting
v. Trunk, 856 P.2d 536, 542 (Mont. 1993).
71 See Robert W. Hillman, Law Firm Risk Management in an Era of Breakups and
Lawyer Mobility: Limitations and Opportunities, 43 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 449, 465 (2011).
72 Creel v. Lilly, 729 A.2d 385, 391 (Md. 1999); Hurwitz v. Padden, 581 N.W.2d 359,
361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); Gast v. Peters, 671 N.W.2d 758, 762–63 (Neb. 2003).
73 The term “surviving partner” as used in the UPA refers to “those partners who
have survived another partner’s death.” Bushard v. Reisman, 800 N.W.2d 373, 381
(Wis. 2011).
74 See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(f) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1914)
(“No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business, except
that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in winding
up the partnership affairs.”); see, e.g., Kahn v. Seely, 980 S.W.2d 794, 798–99 (Tex. App.
1998) (applying Texas version of UPA and denying former partner extra compensation for
winding up dissolved partnership’s affairs).
75 Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 n.2 (Ct. App. 1984). Under the UPA, partners
are entitled to reimbursement for reasonable overhead expenses they incur in completing
the dissolved firm’s unfinished business. Id. at 19. Unfortunately, courts do not agree on
how to calculate reasonable overhead expenses for which a partner may seek
reimbursement. Hammes v. Frank, 579 N.E.2d 1348, 1353 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). Under
one formulation, “overhead” refers to a lawyer’s direct costs, i.e. those costs that can be
specifically attributed to a matter without apportionment. See id. The other possibility is
to include within the definition of overhead indirect costs that cannot be allocated to a
particular case or matter, such as rent, library expenses, staff salaries, utilities, and so
on. See id. (noting the competing approaches).
76 See, e.g., LaFond v. Sweeney, 343 P.3d 939, 943–44 (Colo. 2015) (deciding whether
to apply the no compensation rule in the dissolution of a law firm organized as an LLC).
77 Greenspan v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (In re Brobeck, Phleger
& Harrison LLP), 408 B.R. 318, 326 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) (discussing California
partnership law); HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 56, § 401(h).
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their partnership agreements.78 A Jewel waiver is intended to
ensure that the partnership has no property interest in client
matters at the time of dissolution so that departing lawyers may
take open matters with them without having to account for fees
earned on them post-dissolution.79 Although a Jewel waiver
should override the default rules of state partnership laws, to be
effective, it must be adopted at a time when it will not be exposed
to challenge in bankruptcy as a fraudulent conveyance or
transfer of partnership assets.80
B.

Partners’ Fiduciary Duties Post-Dissolution
Partnership is a fiduciary relation, and partners owe
fiduciary duties to one another and to their firms.81 Dissolution
alters partners’ fiduciary duties in some respects, but it does not
entirely extinguish them. Specifically, dissolution erases a
partner’s loyalty obligation not to compete with the partnership
in the conduct of partnership business.82 A partner therefore may
compete with her former colleagues and dissolved law firm for
new business, even if that new business comes from clients that
were clients of the firm when it dissolved.83 In all other respects,
however, partners’ fiduciary duties continue through the winding
up phase.84 Termination of the partnership terminates the
partners’ fiduciary duties.85
78 See Rachel M. Arnett, Ripping the Jackson Pollock Off the Wall: Reconciling Jewel
v. Boxer with the Modern Law Firm, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 557, 562 (2013) (“A
partnership can opt out of the unfinished business rule by including a Jewel waiver in its
partnership agreement. The effect is simple: partners no longer have any financial
obligations to the partnership with regard to fees collected as part of the winding-up
phase.”) (footnote omitted).
79 Hurt, supra note 7, at 577–78; Michael D. DeBaecke & Victoria Guilfoyle, Law
Firm Dissolutions: When the Music Stops, Does Anyone Need to Account for Any
Unfinished Business?, 14 DEL. L. REV. 41, 66 (2013).
80 See, e.g., In re Brobeck, 408 B.R. at 336–47 (involving claims by a dissolved law
firm’s bankruptcy trustee that the firm’s Jewel waiver gave rise to fraudulent conveyances).
81 In re Rueth Dev. Co., 976 N.E.2d 42, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); RAS AAP, LLC
v. Alyeska Ocean, Inc., 358 P.3d 483, 490 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015).
82 HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 56, § 404(b)(3) (restricting
a partner’s duty of loyalty “to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct
of partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership”) (emphasis added).
83 Smith, Keller & Assocs. v. Dorr & Assocs., 875 P.2d 1258, 1267 (Wyo. 1994)
(quoting Fraser v. Bogucki, 250 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (Ct. App. 1988)).
84 See Tucker v. Ellbogen, 793 P.2d 592, 597 (Colo. App. 1989) (“After the dissolution
of a partnership, each partner continues to have a fiduciary duty to the other partner
until the partnership assets have been divided and the liabilities have been satisfied.”);
Ruse v. Bleeke, 914 N.E.2d 1, 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“Partners owe a fiduciary duty to
one another that continues until final termination of the business of the partnership.”);
Miami Subs Corp. v. Murray Family Tr., 703 A.2d 1366, 1374 (N.H. 1997) (stating that
fiduciary duties continue through winding up and until termination); Huber v. Etkin, 58
A.3d 772, 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (stating that partners’ fiduciary duties continue
through winding up); M.R. Champion, Inc. v. Mizell, 904 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1995)
(stating that partners owe each other and their partnership a fiduciary duty in the
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In some jurisdictions, the continuation of fiduciary duties
may be statutorily prescribed. Under RUPA, for example,
partners’ duties to account and to refrain from dealing with the
partnership on behalf of a party having an adverse interest
expressly continue through wind up.86 The duty of good faith and
fair dealing set forth in RUPA section 404(d) has no durational
limit, and therefore should be understood to continue through the
winding up phase.87 Included among partners’ post-dissolution
duties that continue during the winding-up phase is the duty to
complete the partnership’s unfinished business.88 The failure to
discharge this duty is actionable and is ordinarily remedied by a
monetary damage award that can be credited in an accounting.89
It is possible to breach this duty by requiring another partner to
bear a disproportionate burden of unfinished business to complete.90
III. IN RE THELEN AND HELLER EHRMAN AND THE SHIFTING
UNFINISHED BUSINESS TERRAIN
As pointed out earlier, courts have historically applied the
unfinished business doctrine to matters billed by the hour.91

winding up of partnership business); Inv’r Assocs. v. Copeland, 546 S.E.2d 431, 436 (Va.
2001) (stating that “partners owe each other a fiduciary duty in winding up the
partnership affairs”). But see 6D Farm Corp. v. Carr, 882 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (App. Div.
2009) (stating that “[t]he ‘fiduciary relation between partners terminates upon notice of
dissolution, even though the partnership affairs have not been wound up’”) (quoting In re
Silverberg, 438 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (App. Div. 1981)). The 6D Farm Corp. court’s blanket
statement is dubious, however, since the court in In re Silverberg, whose opinion the 6D
Farm Corp. court quoted, was referring only to partners’ post-dissolution ability to
represent clients who were clients of the firm at the time of dissolution. In re Silverberg,
438 N.Y.S.2d at 144. Read properly, In re Silverberg expresses only the general rule that
dissolution erases a partner’s loyalty obligation not to compete with the partnership in
the conduct of partnership business, but leaves intact other fiduciary duties. The case
certainly does not support the broad rule that the 6D Farm Corp. court apparently drew
from it. Accordingly, courts and lawyers should be very wary of relying on the 6D Farm
Corp. opinion as authority on this issue.
85 See In re Rueth Dev. Co., 976 N.E.2d 42, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“Under common
law, general partners owe each other and the partnership fiduciary duties until final
termination of the partnership.”); Marr v. Langhoff, 589 A.2d 470, 476 (Md. 1991) (stating
that partners’ “mutual fiduciary duties cease when the winding up is completed”).
86 HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 56, §§ 404(b)(1), (2).
87 See id. § 404(d) (“A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the
other partners . . . consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.”).
88 Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678, 685 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000); Kirsch v. Leventhal, 586 N.Y.S.2d 330, 333 (App. Div. 1992); Smith, Keller &
Assocs. v. Dorr & Assocs., 875 P.2d 1258, 1267 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Bader v. Cox, 701
S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. App. 1985)).
89 Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685.
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Robinson v. Nussbaum, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–6 (D.D.C. 1997) (applying
District of Columbia law); Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 573 (Ct. App. 1993)
(“[U]nfinished business simply consists of all matters in progress which have not been
completed at the time the firm is dissolved. . . . That one matter is to be compensated at
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Courts have reasonably concluded that the unfinished business
doctrine should apply to all matters within its scope regardless of
lawyers’ compensation arrangements with clients.92 This
conclusion is correct because the unfinished business doctrine is
simply an aspect of partnership law that upholds partners’
fiduciary duties to one another and to their firm in the event
of dissolution.93
In 2014, however, two cases radically altered the unfinished
business terrain by rejecting the doctrine’s application to client
matters that are billed hourly. The New York Court of Appeals
held in Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP)94 that
“pending hourly fee matters are not ‘partnership property’ or
‘unfinished business’ within the meaning of New York’s
Partnership Law.”95 In Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright,
Tremaine LLP,96 a California federal court reasoned that
California law was “unsettled on the question of whether a law
firm may assert a property interest in hourly fee matters pending
at the time of its dissolution,”97 and then held that equity and
public policy weighed against application of the unfinished
business doctrine in that context.98 That decision was appealed,
and the ultimate outcome in Heller Ehrman will now be decided
by the California Supreme Court on a certified question from the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.99 As will be
explained below, In re Thelen LLP was wrongly decided as a
matter of partnership law, and Heller Ehrman was wrongly
decided in the district court.
A.

In re Thelen
Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP)100 arose out
of the October 2008 dissolution of the law firm Thelen LLP
(“Thelen”) and the August 2005 dissolution of the venerable law
firm Coudert Brothers LLP (“Coudert”).101 Both underlying cases
require some discussion.
an hourly rate and another on a contingency basis is of no consequence in determining
whether a matter is unfinished business.”) (citation omitted).
92 See, e.g., Grossman v. Davis, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 356 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating
that the Jewel doctrine applies regardless of “the nature of the compensation agreement
with the client”).
93 Rogers, supra note 25, at 336.
94 20 N.E.3d 264, 264 (N.Y. 2014).
95 Id. at 266–67.
96 527 B.R. 24 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
97 Id. at 30.
98 Id. at 30–33.
99 See infra Part III.B.3.
100 20 N.E.3d 264 (N.Y. 2014).
101 Id. at 267–69.
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1. The Underlying Thelen and Coudert Dissolutions and
Bankruptcy Cases
First, in connection with Thelen’s dissolution in October
2008, the firm’s partners adopted a fourth amended partnership
agreement and a written plan of dissolution.102 The new
partnership agreement stated that it was governed by California
law, and unlike prior agreements, included a Jewel or unfinished
business waiver.103 The waiver provided that:
Neither the Partners nor the Partnership shall have any claim or
entitlement to clients, cases or matters ongoing at the time of the
dissolution of the Partnership other than the entitlement for collection
of amounts due for work performed by the Partners and other
Partnership personnel prior to their departure from the Partnership.
The provisions of this [section] are intended to expressly waive, opt
out of and be in lieu of any rights any Partner of the Partnership may
have to “unfinished business” of the Partnership, as the term is
defined in Jewel v. Boxer . . . or as otherwise might be provided in the
absence of this provision through the interpretation of the [California
Uniform Partnership Act of 1994, as amended].104

Following Thelen’s dissolution, ten former Thelen partners
joined the New York office of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, and another
former Thelen partner joined Seyfarth in California.105 They
brought a number of open matters with them from Thelen.106
They worked on those matters at Seyfarth and Seyfarth billed
the clients for their services.107
In September 2009, Thelen filed for bankruptcy protection in
the Southern District of New York.108 The bankruptcy trustee,
Yann Geron, sued Seyfarth to recover the value of Thelen’s
unfinished business for the bankruptcy estate’s creditors.109 He
asserted that the open hourly matters the former Thelen
partners took to Seyfarth were the dissolved firm’s assets, and
that Thelen’s partners fraudulently transferred those assets to
individual partners when they adopted the partnership
agreement with the Jewel waiver on the eve of the
firm’s dissolution.110

102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at 267.
Id.
Id. (quoting the partnership agreement).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 267–68.
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Seyfarth moved for judgment on the pleadings.111 The
district court granted the motion.112 In holding for Seyfarth, the
district court (1) determined that New York law controlled the
dispute; (2) reasoned that under New York law, the unfinished
business doctrine did not apply to hourly fee matters; and
(3) concluded that a partnership does not retain a property
interest in such matters upon dissolution.113 Recognizing the
gravity of its decision, however, the district court certified its
order for interlocutory appeal.114 Geron appealed to the Second
Circuit as expected.
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that New
York law controlled the dispute, but further recognized the
absence of controlling New York authority.115 Given the
significance of the issues involved, the court reasoned that
certifying appropriate questions to New York’s highest court for
determination was preferable to deciding the case based on its
singular interpretation of New York law.116 The Second Circuit
therefore certified two questions to the New York Court
of Appeals:
Under New York law, is a client matter that is billed on an hourly
basis the property of a law firm, such that, upon dissolution and in
related bankruptcy proceedings, the law firm is entitled to the profit
earned on such matters as the “unfinished business” of the firm?
If so, how does New York law define a “client matter” for purposes of
the unfinished business doctrine and what proportion of the profit
derived from an ongoing hourly matter may the new law
firm retain?117

Turning now to Coudert, the firm dissolved in line with the
terms of its partnership agreement in August 2005.118 On the
same day they voted to dissolve, the firm’s equity partners
adopted a special authorization, which authorized the firm’s
executive board to:
[T]ake such actions as it may deem necessary and appropriate,
including, without limitation, the granting of waivers, notwithstanding
any provisions to the contrary in the Partnership Agreement . . . , in
order to:

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 268.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See In re Thelen, 736 F.3d 213, 224 (2d Cir. 2013).
See id. at 223–24.
Id. at 225.
In re Thelen, 20 N.E.3d 264, 268 (N.Y. 2014).
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a. . . . sell all or substantially all of the assets of . . . the Firm to other
firms or service providers, in order to maximize the value of the
Firm’s assets and business;
b. wind down the business of the Firm with a view to continuing the
provision of legal services to clients and the orderly transition of client
matters to other firms or service providers, in order to maximize the
value of the Firm’s assets and business to the extent practicable.119

Former Coudert partners joined several different law firms,
taking open matters with them to their new firms.120 They
completed all but two of those matters at their new firms on an
hourly basis.121
In September 2006, Coudert filed for bankruptcy protection
in the Southern District of New York.122 The administrator of
Coudert’s estate, Development Specialists, Inc. (“DSI”), brought
adversary actions against law firms that had hired former
Coudert partners.123 DSI alleged that the firms were liable to
Coudert for any profits derived from the matters brought to them
by the former Coudert partners.124 The law firms moved for
summary judgment on the basis that the unfinished business
doctrine did not apply to hourly matters, and DSI cross-moved
for a declaration that the open client matters were Coudert’s
property at the time of dissolution.125 The district court sided
with DSI, and held that the former Coudert partners had to
account for any profits they earned while winding up the client
matters at their new firms.126
The district court certified its decision for immediate appeal
and, as expected, the law firms appealed.127 The Second Circuit
then certified to the New York Court of Appeals the same two
questions asked in In re Thelen.128
2. The New York Court of Appeals Decision in In re Thelen
The In re Thelen court began its analysis of Geron’s and
DSI’s unfinished business claims by noting that the New York
Partnership Law (the “Partnership Law”) was based on the
Id. at 268–69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 269.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. (quoting Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 477
B.R. 318, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d in part, vacated in part, In re Coudert Bros. LLP, 574
F. App’x 15 (2d Cir. 2014)).
127 Id.
128 Id. (citing In re Coudert Bros. LLP, Nos. 12-4916(L) et al., 2013 WL 9363394, at
*1–2 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2013)).
119
120
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UPA.129 It went on to frame the unfinished business doctrine,
explaining that absent contrary agreement, profits attributable
to work begun by former partners of a dissolved law firm predissolution are a partnership asset that must be finished for the
dissolved firm’s benefit.130 Under the Partnership Law and the
UPA more generally, “because departing partners owe a fiduciary
duty to the dissolved firm and their former partners to account
for benefits obtained from use of partnership property in winding
up the partnership’s business, they may not be separately
compensated.”131 But critically, the court noted that the
Partnership Law does not define partnership property; it sets
“default rules for how a partnership upon dissolution divides
property as elsewhere defined” under New York law.132 As a
result, the In re Thelen court reasoned the Partnership Law does
not control the determination of whether “a law firm’s ‘client
matters’ are partnership property.”133
Continuing, the court explained that in New York, clients
have the unqualified right to terminate an attorney-client
relationship at any time with no obligation beyond paying the
lawyer for the reasonable value of her completed services.134 As a
result, law firms cannot have property interests in future hourly
fees because such fees are too uncertain and speculative.135
Furthermore, prior New York cases on which Geron and DSI
relied on had “never suggested that a law firm owns anything
with respect to a client matter other than yet-unpaid
compensation for legal services already provided.”136 For
instance, courts applying the unfinished business doctrine to
contingent fee matters had uniformly held that the dissolved law
firm could recover only “the ‘value’ of its services.”137
The In re Thelen court further reasoned that treating a
dissolved law firm’s open hourly matters as partnership property
“would have numerous perverse effects,” would offend “basic
principles that govern the attorney-client relationship,” and
would violate ethics rules.138 To allow the former partners of a
dissolved law firm to profit from work they did not perform, at
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. (quoting In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y. 1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
135 Id. at 270–71 (quoting Verizon New England, Inc. v. Transcom Enhanced Servs.,
Inc., 990 N.E.2d 121, 124 (N.Y. 2013)).
136 Id. at 271.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 273.
129
130
131
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the expense of a former colleague and her new firm, would grant
them an unjust windfall.139 Furthermore, because the unfinished
business doctrine does not attach to profits earned on open
matters that go with former partners who bolt from a struggling
firm before it dissolves, Geron and DSI’s approach “would
encourage partners to get out the door, with clients in tow, before
it is too late, rather than remain and work to bolster the firm’s
prospects. Obviously, this run-on-the-bank mentality makes the
turnaround of a struggling firm less likely.”140 Finally, lawyers
who linger too long at a failing firm are placed in a precarious
position.141 Faced with the prospect of rebating their fees to their
former law firm, they might advise their clients that they can no
longer afford to represent them, which would disrupt the clients’
representations and impose a practical restriction on their right
to choose their own counsel.142 “Or, more likely,” the In re Thelen
court worried that tardy lawyers would find it hard to obtain
positions with new law firms because any profits from their work
for current clients would go to their old firms rather than their
new ones.143
Geron and DSI argued that clients do not care which law
firm their fees go to as long as their matters are handled
properly.144 The In re Thelen court disagreed based on its prior
reasoning.145 Additionally, clients might worry that their hourly
fee matters would be neglected if the new law firm could not
profit off them.146 The court ridiculed the idea that firms would
hire partners from dissolved law firms or accept client matters
without the promise of compensation.147 “Followed to its logical
conclusion,” the court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ approach
would hurt clients, lawyers, and law firms without producing the
desired financial rewards for bankrupt firms’ estates.148
Ultimately, applying the unfinished business doctrine to hourly
fee matters would contradict New York’s strong public policy
favoring client choice and lawyer mobility.149
Finally, the court rejected Geron and DSI’s argument that a
law firm can avoid the unfinished business doctrine by inserting

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id. (quoting Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R. 732, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (saying that such a position “ignores commonsense and marketplace realities”).
Id.
Id.
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a Jewel waiver in its partnership agreement.150 From the
court’s perspective:
This suggestion fails to consider the possibility that classifying clients’
pending hourly fee matters as firm property may lead to untoward
unintended consequences. For example, the trustees . . . limit their
sought-after recoveries to client matters that remain unresolved as of
the date of a law firm’s dissolution. As Seyfarth pointed out, though, if
a client’s pending matter is partnership property, why doesn’t every
lawyer whose clients follow him to a new firm breach fiduciary duties
owed his former law firm and partners? In the end, the trustees’
theory simply does not comport with our profession’s traditions and
the commercial realities of the practice of law today, a deficiency
beyond the capacity of a Jewel waiver to cure.151

Accordingly, the court concluded that the first certified
question should be answered negatively.152 It was unnecessary to
answer the second certified question.153
3. Analysis
In re Thelen should perhaps be read as rejecting the UPA’s
no compensation rule, rather than as a rejecting the unfinished
business doctrine altogether, since many of the court’s concerns
about the doctrine’s effects vanish under RUPA, which permits
reasonable compensation for partners who conclude a dissolved
law firm’s unfinished business.154 Indeed, the decision should
have no persuasive force in jurisdictions that have adopted
RUPA. Even in jurisdictions still glued to the UPA, however, the
court’s reasoning wilts under scrutiny. Courts writing on a blank
slate would be justified in disregarding the decision.
First, the position that future hourly fees are too uncertain
or speculative to count as partnership property defies logic in
practice. If those fees were as uncertain as the court reasoned, no
sensible departing partners would take open matters with them
to their new firms. No lawyer wants to relocate to a new firm and
start that relationship on the wrong foot by delivering
uncollectible client matters. Even collecting a security retainer is
no protection against a client’s termination of a representation.155
In reality, the clients that lawyers take with them to new firms
are almost always reliable payors. Of course, if a lawyer collects
fees from matters opened at her former firm at her new firm, the
Id. at 274.
Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.6.3.2, at 4:74–75.
155 See Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Retainers and Flat Fees, 34 J. LEGAL
PROF. 113, 129 (2009) (explaining that security retainers are refundable until earned).
150
151
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fees must be the dissolved partnership’s property because they
are no longer contingent or speculative in that case.156
Second, allowing a dissolved law firm to profit from work it
did not perform at the expense of a former partner and her new
firm grants the dissolved firm no windfall.157 The former partner
and her new firm would not have had that matter but for the
existence and support of the dissolved firm where the matter
originated. The client originally hitched its star to the dissolved
firm, not the new firm.
Third, the argument that because the unfinished business
doctrine does not attach to profits earned on open matters that go
with former partners who bolt from a struggling firm before it
dissolves, enforcement of the doctrine post-dissolution “would
encourage partners to get out the door, with clients in tow, before
it is too late, rather than remain and work to bolster the firm’s
prospects” is at best exaggerated and speculative.158 On the other
side of the speculation coin, not enforcing the unfinished business
doctrine might also negatively affect partners’ behavior. For
example, partners who control key client relationships might
delay opening new matters for those clients until they have
relocated their practices, or attempt to account for time spent on
matters pre-dissolution in ways that will defeat the dissolving
firm’s right to the associated fees. Besides, other legal principles,
such as quantum meruit, serve to police opportunistic conduct in
those circumstances.
The second part of this argument—the prospect of a trustee
or receiver enforcing the unfinished business doctrine creates a
“run-on-the-bank mentality [that] makes the turnaround of a
struggling firm less likely”159—is equally flawed. A partner run
typically begins while a firm is profitable, if perhaps not quite as
profitable as it was in its best years.160 In other words, a partner
run begins before a firm is “struggling” or requires a
“turnaround.”161 It begins long before partners perceive the
unfinished business doctrine as a professional threat. While
partner runs often cause firms to collapse, their origins are not
connected to the unfinished business doctrine.

156 See Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 14 (asserting that fees earned from
matters open at the time of dissolution are property of the dissolved partnership).
157 In re Thelen, 20 N.E.3d at 273 (citing Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP, 476 B.R.
732, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Morley, supra note 1, at 4.
161 See id; In re Thelen, 20 N.E.3d at 273.
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Fourth, the concern that lawyers will neglect open matters
they take with them to new firms because of the effect of the
unfinished business doctrine assumes that those lawyers are
willing to violate their ethical duties of competence and
diligence.162 That can’t be right. Furthermore, if a lawyer
neglects a matter because it is not profitable and the client is
harmed as a result, the client has adequate remedies in the form
of causes of action for professional negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty against the lawyer and her new law firm. More
important, the true value that a partner brings to the new law
firm generally is not pending matters, but rather the client
relationship and expectation of substantial future work from that
client. Inattention to unfinished work would destroy the real
asset at issue to the obvious detriment of the lawyers looking to
transfer the client relationship, as well as to their new law firms.
Fifth, the rationale that enforcing the unfinished business
doctrine would limit clients’ right to counsel of their choice is
deeply flawed. While clients’ right to counsel of their choice is
certainly important, it has never been unbridled. For instance, a
court may disqualify a lawyer from representing a client in
litigation regardless of the client’s interest in retaining that
lawyer’s services.163 Furthermore, as two commenters have
explained in the context of law firm dissolutions:
In the context of a firm dissolution any number of factors may
preclude a client [from] following one or more attorneys to a new firm.
There may be a conflict that precludes that engagement from
transitioning. The new firm may have a fee structure that the client
finds undesirable. The client may have had an adverse relationship
with that new firm such that they are not willing to transition their
files to that firm. For these and any number of other reasons a client
may either elect not to transfer an engagement to an attorney’s new
firm or be precluded from doing so. Simply put, a lawyer leaving one

162 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”); id. r. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client.”).
163 See Martinez v. Cty. of Antelope, No. 4:15CV3064, 2016 WL 3248241, at *6 (D.
Neb. June 13, 2016) (“When considering motions to disqualify, courts must balance public
policy concerns and the court’s responsibility to uphold the integrity of judicial
proceedings with a party’s right to select his or her own counsel. In determining whether
to disqualify counsel, a court balances the interests and motivations of the attorneys, the
clients, and the public.”); Parke v. Cowley Cty., No. 15-1372-JTM-TJJ, 2016 WL 2609610,
at *2 (D. Kan. May 6, 2016) (“‘The right to counsel of choice is an important one subject to
override for compelling reasons.’ Even so, this right is secondary in importance to
preserving the integrity of the judicial process, maintaining the public confidence in the
legal system and enforcing the ethical standards of professional conduct.”)
(footnotes omitted).

Do Not Delete

304

6/20/17 7:13 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 20:2

firm is under no obligation to insure that his or her new firm is
acceptable to an existing client.164

Moreover, the concern the In re Thelen court expressed is the
so-called “lock-out” effect of the unfinished business doctrine;
that is, enforcing the doctrine supposedly locks-out clients from
lawyers of their choice.165 Yet, despite the many law firm
dissolutions to date, lock-out has never been shown to have
occurred.166 There is no evidence that the phenomenon exists.167
Additionally, as I have explained elsewhere, “[a]ssuming client
worthiness, migrating partners should seek to continue clients’
representations in order to be hired by those clients in new
matters. As a general rule, repeat clients face no substantial risk
of lock-out.”168
B.

The Heller Ehrman Case

1. The District Court Decision
The other recent case, Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright,
Tremaine LLP,169 traces back to the September 2008 dissolution
of the global law firm Heller Ehrman LLP (“Heller”).170 Heller
was made up of several professional corporations (“PCs”) whose
lawyer-shareholders served the firm’s clients.171 The PCs voted to
dissolve the firm pursuant to a written dissolution plan after the
firm’s largest creditor, Bank of America, declared Heller to be in
default on the firm’s operational $35 million line of credit and

Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 13.
See Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Law
Partnerships: The No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1597,
1617–18 (1985).
166 Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 13. In Heller Ehrman LLP v. Jones Day (In
re Heller Ehrman LLP), the record included internal Heller communications in which
shareholders discussed other law firms’ possible reluctance to employ Heller lawyers and
staff absent a Jewel waiver. In re Heller Ehrman LLP, No. 08-32514DM, 2013 WL
951706, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013). For example, one shareholder wrote that
other firms were “acutely aware of the Jewel v. Boxer problem” and would “want some
assurance that they won’t get trapped in that net.” Id. To suggest otherwise, he
speculated, would cause those firms to “simply opt out with no jobs for individuals and
nothing for the firm.” Id. Of course, none of that private conjecture constitutes evidence
of lock-out.
167 See Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 13 (“[A]s to the argument that clients
may be, consequent to the Unfinished Business Doctrine, locked out of the counsel they
desire, it is only that, an argument. With a majority of jurisdictions having to date
followed Jewel, it would be expected that the cases and commentary would recite
incidents of lock-out. It is at minimum curious that such a calamitous outcome . . . cannot
be shown to have ever occurred.”).
168 Richmond, supra note 11, at 418.
169 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine LLP, 527 B.R. 24 (N.D.
Cal. 2014).
170 Id. at 27.
171 Id.
164
165
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seized the firm’s bank accounts.172 Heller’s dissolution plan
included a Jewel waiver that waived any rights and claims under
the unfinished business doctrine to fees resulting from hourly fee
matters open at the time of dissolution.173 Heller filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy in December 2008.174
Heller’s bankruptcy trustee sued Davis, Wright, Tremaine
LLP (“Davis Wright”) and other law firms to which Heller’s
lawyers dispersed.175 The trustee alleged that the bankruptcy
estate was entitled to recover profits from open hourly fee
matters because the Jewel waiver in the dissolution plan was a
fraudulent transfer of Heller’s property under either bankruptcy
code or California law.176 The bankruptcy court granted the
defendant’s summary judgment.177 The trustee sought review by
the district court.
The district court reasoned that it was addressing a question
of first impression: “whether a law firm—which has been
dissolved by virtue of creditors terminating their financial
support, thus rendering it impossible to continue to provide legal
services in ongoing matters—is entitled to assert a property
interest in hourly fee matters pending at the time of its
dissolution.”178 The district court answered this question
negatively, and started by shredding the trustee’s claim that
Jewel v. Boxer179 controlled the outcome in this case.
Jewel is different . . . for five key, related reasons. First, the
dissolution of the firm . . . in Jewel was voluntary, while Heller’s
dissolution was forced when Bank of America withdrew the firm’s line
of credit. This is significant because the partners in Jewel could have,
but chose not to, finish representing their clients as or on behalf of the
old firm. Here, Heller lacked the financial ability to continue
providing legal services to its clients, leaving clients . . . no choice but
to seek new counsel and Heller [s]hareholders no choice but to seek
new employment. Second, in Jewel, “[t]he new firms represented the
clients under fee agreements entered into between the client and the
old firm.” . . . Here, the clients signed new retainer agreements with
the new firms. Third, in Jewel, the new firms consisted entirely of
partners from the old firms. . . . Here, [the] [d]efendants are
preexisting third-party firms that provided substantively new
representation, requiring significant resources, personnel, capital, and

Id.
Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Jones Day (In re Heller Ehrman LLP), No. 08-32514DM,
Adversary No. 10-3221DM, 2013 WL 951706, at *17 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2013).
178 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 25.
179 203 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
172
173
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services well beyond the capacity of either Heller or its individual
[s]hareholders. Where in Jewel, the departed partners continued to
have fiduciary duties to each other and the old firm, here, the
third-party firms never owed any duty . . . to the dissolved firm.
Fourth, Jewel treated hourly fee matters and contingency fee matters
as indistinguishable. Here, there are no contingency fee cases at issue.
Finally, Jewel was decided in 1984 and thus applied the Uniform
Partnership Act . . . which the materially different Revised Uniform
Partnership Act . . . has since superseded. The RUPA, which applies
after 1999 to all California partnerships, allows partners to obtain
“reasonable compensation” for helping to wind up partnership
business . . . and thus undermines the legal foundation on which
Jewel rests.180

The Heller Ehrman court observed that cases applying Jewel
were poorly reasoned, predated California’s adoption of RUPA, or
both.181 The California Supreme Court had not addressed the
unfinished business doctrine in this context.182 Because, in the
court’s view, California law was unsettled on the issue of a law
firm’s property interest in hourly fee matters open when it
dissolved, the court felt free to weigh the equities.183
The court began its analysis on the “bedrock” idea that
lawyers expect to be paid for their services and clients expect to
pay the law firm that employs the lawyers who serve them.184 It
was therefore easy to conclude that the firms that did the work at
issue should keep the fees earned from it.185
The trustee argued that the former Heller shareholders owed
a fiduciary duty to the firm’s estate to account for profits their
new firms earned from the former Heller matters.186 But, the
court noted, the fiduciary duty to account is limited to
partnership property,187 and the equities did not support the
recognition of a property interest here.188 As the court explained:
A law firm never owns its client matters. The client always owns the
matter, and the most the law firm can be said to have is an
expectation of future business. . . . [T]he Trustee was unable to
articulate a basis for calculating the value of this expected future
business. The Trustee suggested that the value at issue here is “good
will,” which does not ordinarily appear on law firm balance sheets
which are on a modified cash basis. In California, and beyond,

180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 29 (citations omitted).
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404(b)(1)).
Id.
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professional law partnerships do not have a “good will” asset. . . . The
good will the [t]rustee discussed may be real in one sense: certainly a
firm’s reputation is a crucial part of its ability to obtain work.
However, good will is not an asset to which a property interest
attaches. Moreover, Heller’s bankruptcy did much to undermine the
firm’s otherwise stellar reputation and to eviscerate any reasonable
expectation of future business.
Obviously, the expectation of future business—if it is
“good will”—would disappear as soon as either (1) the client removes
business, which it can do at will, or (2) the law firm ceases to be
able to perform the work to generate those expected future
profits. . . . Here, the client matters at issue ceased to be Heller’s
partnership business and became the [d]efendants’ partnership
business when the clients terminated Heller and retained new,
third-party counsel.189

The trustee had conceded in bankruptcy court that the
departing lawyers’ duty to account for unfinished business was
attributable solely to Heller’s dissolution.190 This puzzled the
district court, which saw no reason “why the duties, rights, and
property interests at stake . . . should be different simply because
Heller dissolved.”191 If dissolution did alter the equitable terrain,
it did so in favor of Davis Wright and the other defendant law
firms.192 Once Heller dissolved, it could no longer represent
its clients, thereby forcing them to seek alternative
representation. 193 The defendants “came to the rescue of these
clients” and agreed to represent them in their existing matters.194
The former Heller clients entered into new retainer agreements
with the defendants, which “provided substantively new
representation, requiring significant resources, personnel,
capital, and services” that dwarfed the capacity of Heller and its
former shareholders.195
The court recognized that, as in all bankruptcies, the plight
of creditors and former employees was “deplorable.”196
Nonetheless, because the defendant law firms generated the fees
at issue, the equities supported the retention of those fees.197
The Heller Ehrman court also reasoned that public policy
backed the defendant law firms.198 The trustee had argued that
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Id. at 30–31 (citations omitted).
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
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enforcing the Jewel no compensation rule prevents partners from
wrestling for the most lucrative cases during the life of the firm
in the hope of keeping them should the firm dissolve.199 Second,
the Jewel rule discourages partners from effectively looting the
firm by soliciting existing clients upon dissolution.200
Unfortunately for the trustee, neither issue concerned
the court.201
Because the profits in question were generated by Davis
Wright and the other law firms, any incentive the former Heller
shareholders may have had to game their former firm’s system
was not squarely at issue.202 Furthermore, the former Heller
clients chose to engage the defendant law firms, not because any
shareholders had physical possession of their files, but because
Heller could no longer represent them.203
Strangely, the trustee could not even provide a workable
definition of “winding up” or “unfinished business.”204 The court
acknowledged that Heller should be paid “for the time its lawyers
spent filing motions for continuances, noticing parties and courts
that it was withdrawing as counsel, packing up and shipping
client files back to the clients or to new counsel, and getting new
counsel up to speed on pending matters” on the basis that such
tasks are “what winding up unfinished business entails when a
firm dissolves in the context of a bankruptcy.”205 The court found
it incomprehensible that winding up Heller’s affairs might
encompass litigating matters long after the firm dissolved.206
“Public policy [could not] favor such an outcome.”207
Like the In re Thelen court,208 the Heller Ehrman court
believed that enforcing the unfinished business doctrine would
perversely “incentivize partners of a struggling firm to jump ship
at the first sign of trouble to avoid the kind of suit [the]
[d]efendants now [found] themselves in, even if that would
destabilize an otherwise viable firm.”209 Recognizing the
unfinished business doctrine here would further discourage law
firms from hiring former partners of dissolved firms and from
accepting new clients formerly represented by lawyers in

199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209

Id. (quoting Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (Ct. App. 1984)).
Id.
Id. (saying that neither issue was “at play here”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 20 N.E.3d 264, 273 (N.Y. 2014).
Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 32.
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dissolved firms.210 The court concluded that it was not in the
public interest to make it harder for partners leaving a dissolved
firm to find new jobs or to limit clients’ choice of counsel by
preventing firms from profiting off the labor and capital
they expend or invest in matters previously handled by a
dissolved firm.211
In the end, the court could not justify recognizing a property
interest in Heller’s pending hourly matters.212 It thus entered
summary judgment for the defendants.213
2. Analysis
Heller Ehrman is an unfortunate mix of suspect reasoning,
incomplete analysis, unfounded assumptions, insufficient
attention to partnership law, and detachment from the reality of
large law firm practice. District court decisions are never
precedential,214 but Heller Ehrman is not even persuasive when
closely analyzed.
First, in explaining that the former Heller shareholders’
fiduciary duty to account to the estate was “limited to
partnership property” en route to deciding that equity did not
support recognition of a property interest in unfinished business,
the court misread the statute on which it relied, California
Corporations Code § 16404(b)(1).215 This was a fatal error.
Section 16404(b)(1), which duplicates RUPA § 404(b)(1), extends
the duty to account well beyond partnership property. Section
16404(b)(1) states that a partner’s duty of loyalty requires her to
account for “any property, profit, or benefit derived by the partner
in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or
derived from a use by the partner of partnership property or
information, including the appropriation of a partnership
opportunity.”216 In short, the former Heller shareholders’ duty to
account to the estate was clearly not limited to partnership
property, but plainly extended to the profits the trustee was
seeking to recover.

Id. at 33.
Id. (citing Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LPP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213, 223 (2d
Cir. 2013)).
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 See Vertex Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231
(D. Mass. 2009) (“As Judges Posner and Easterbrook have repeatedly and accurately
observed, with characteristic bluntness, district court decisions are neither authoritative
nor precedential.”).
215 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 30 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404(b)(1)).
216 CAL. CORP. CODE § 16404(b)(1) (West 2016) (emphasis added).
210
211
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Second, the court’s efforts at distinguishing Jewel missed the
mark. The attempt to do so on the basis that the firm’s decision
to dissolve in Jewel was voluntary and thus the partners could
have finished their clients’ matters on behalf of the old firm,
while Heller was forced to dissolve and thus could not continue
serving clients, was poorly aimed. The UPA and RUPA do not
distinguish between voluntary and involuntary dissolutions.
While Heller, as an entity, could not continue to represent its
clients, individual shareholders could—and did. Their doing so at
new firms is no basis to differentiate Jewel because the partners
there also represented the former firm’s clients at new firms. To
say that the Jewel partners, unlike the Heller shareholders,
could have stayed together through winding up invites the
argument that the unfinished business doctrine is untenable
because of the “lock-in” effect—that is, it forces partners to
remain together in violation of basic freedom of contract
principles to avoid financial disadvantages that may accompany
dissolution and winding up.217
In terms of perverse effects, to distinguish Jewel on the basis
that the partners in that case continued to represent their former
firm’s clients under old engagement agreements, while Heller’s
clients signed new engagement agreements with the firms to
which the Heller lawyers dispersed, is to allow partners of
dissolved firms to avoid their fiduciary duties by exalting form
over substance. That result is neither equitable nor good
public policy.
The attempt to discount Jewel on grounds that the partners
there “continued to have fiduciary duties to each other and the
old firm,” while the defendants in Heller Ehrman “never owed
any duty, fiduciary or otherwise, to the dissolved firm,”218 is a
real head-scratcher. While the defendant law firms did not owe
any duties to Heller, the former Heller shareholders who moved
their practices to those law firms certainly did. It is hard to
understand how the highly-regarded district judge could have
missed this critical and obvious point.
Distinguishing Jewel on the basis that the court there
similarly treated contingent and hourly fees, while in this case
there were no contingent fees in dispute, is mysterious reasoning
at best. The Jewel court did not distinguish contingent fees from
hourly fees, and this case involved hourly fees. The absence of
disputed contingent fees in Heller Ehrman had nothing to do
with anything.
217
218

Richmond, supra note 11, at 59.
Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 29.
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The only valid basis for distinguishing Jewel was California’s
subsequent adoption of RUPA. But that did not mean Heller’s
bankruptcy estate was entitled to no recovery from the law firms;
rather, the adoption of RUPA simply meant that the estate
should have recovered less from those firms than it would have if
the UPA’s no compensation rule had remained California law.
This is because under RUPA, the defendants were entitled to
reasonable compensation for their work on the unfinished
matters at issue. Heller was entitled to recover the difference
between (a) the amount the clients paid for the work at the new
law firms, and (b) the reasonable compensation to which those
firms were entitled for performing the services.
Third, the court concluded as a matter of equity that the law
firms “that did the work [in question] should keep the fees,” and
that because the fees were produced through the defendants’
efforts rather than Heller’s, the trustee could not argue that the
defendants had received a windfall.219 What the court seemingly
overlooked was RUPA’s allowance of reasonable compensation for
lawyers’ services in winding up a dissolved firm’s affairs.220
Surely the allowance of reasonable compensation to the law firms
for completing Heller’s unfinished business would have alleviated
the court’s concerns about the law firms performing work for
which they would not be paid.221
In the same thread, the district court’s focus on ownership of
client matters was misplaced.222 Although Heller did not own the
client matters that departing shareholders took to their new
firms, it did have an enforceable interest in the fees earned by its
former shareholders from those matters.223 The Heller Ehrman
court apparently did not grasp this distinction. And while it is
true that a client’s termination of its relationship with a former
Heller lawyer would sever any claim by the bankruptcy estate to
profits subsequently earned on the client’s matters, the estate
had an interest in any fees earned before a particular client took
that step. There had to be a reasonable way to calculate profits
earned from matters open at the time of Heller’s dissolution,
apart from the trustee’s odd muttering about good will. The
court’s related discussion of future new business from former
Heller clients was hopelessly confused, especially since the
219
220

at 4:75.

Id. at 30.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 16401(h) (West 2016); HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.6.3.2,

HILLMAN, supra note 6, § 4.6.3.2, at 4:75.
See Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 30 (“A law firm never owns its client matters. The
client always owns the matter, and the most the law firm can be said to have is an
expectation of future business.”).
223 Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 14.
221
222
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unfinished business doctrine does not apply to new matters
opened post-dissolution.
Fourth, in weighing the equities, the court’s perception that
the law firms “came to the rescue” of Heller’s former clients in
regard to their ongoing matters reflects a basic misunderstanding
of large law firm practice in general, and of third party law firms’
conduct post-dissolution in particular.224 Davis Wright and the
other excellent law firms involved rescued no one; they accepted
as clients those former clients of Heller whom or which they
viewed as profitable and as sources of future business. That was
perfectly fine—Davis Wright and the other firms were firmly
within their rights to make those business judgments. But they
acted out of self-interest. They certainly did not lower rescue
swimmers or launch lifeboats to bring aboard all former Heller
clients who might need continued or future representation. They
left plenty of former Heller clients adrift for later extraction
by trawlers.
Fifth, the court’s decision to arbitrarily reconceive or
redefine winding-up to shorten this phase of a firm’s demise was
wrong as a matter of partnership law.225 Again, winding up is the
time after dissolution and before termination during which all
partnership affairs are settled.226 The fact that it takes longer to
wind up a law firm’s affairs than it does to wind up another
business’s affairs is an understandable reason to lament the
unfinished business doctrine’s application to law firm
dissolutions, but it does not empower a court to circumscribe this
phase for the sake of convenience. The court cited no case law,
statutory authority, or secondary authority for its crabbed view
of winding-up.
Sixth, the court overreached when it asserted that applying
the unfinished business doctrine to hourly fee matters “would
discourage third-party firms from hiring former partners of
dissolved firms and discourage third-party firms from accepting
new clients formerly represented by dissolved firms.”227 In fact,
law firms want to admit partners from dissolved firms who can
bring desirable business with them. In most cases, firms are less

Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 31.
Id. at 32 (agreeing “that Heller should bill and be paid for the time its lawyers
spent filing motions for continuances, noticing parties and courts that it was withdrawing
as counsel, packing up and shipping client files back to the clients or to new counsel, and
getting new counsel up to speed on pending matters,” and stating that this “is what
winding up unfinished business entails when a firm dissolves in the context of
a bankruptcy”).
226 GREGORY, supra note 47, at 368.
227 Heller Ehrman, 527 B.R. at 33.
224
225
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focused on the open matters that partners bring with them
(beyond clearing conflicts of interest) than they are in
establishing a continuing relationship with those clients that will
yield substantial future business. Negotiating the resolution of
unfinished business claims is a cost of doing business, and a low
cost at that. The partners who are in danger of not finding new
employment when a law firm dissolves are the so-called service
partners who control no meaningful business. But they are not
casualties of the unfinished business doctrine; they are victims of
a law firm culture that generally values technical skill less than
rainmaking ability.
As noted in the analysis of In re Thelen, there is no evidence
that the unfinished business doctrine discourages firms from
representing former clients of a dissolved firm. If a migratory
partner’s new firm declines to represent some of her clients from
her former firm, it is more likely because those clients are not
viewed as sufficiently profitable, because they do not fit the new
firm’s practice model in other respects, or because their
representation would create conflicts of interest with the new
firm’s existing clients.
3. The Trustee’s Appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Heller’s trustee appealed the district court’s decision to the
Ninth Circuit. After hearing oral argument in June 2016, the
Ninth Circuit certified this question to the California Supreme
Court in July 2016: “Under California law, does a dissolved law
firm have a property interest in legal matters that are in
progress but not completed at the time the law firm is dissolved,
when the dissolved law firm had been retained to handle the
matters on an hourly basis?”228 The California Supreme Court’s
decision will determine the outcome of the case.229
At the time this article was submitted, the California
Supreme Court had only recently accepted the case on referral
from the Ninth Circuit, in the process restating the certified
question to ask: “Under California law, what interest, if any, does
a dissolved law firm have in legal matters that are in progress
but not completed at the time the law firm is dissolved, when the
dissolved law firm had been retained to handle the matter on an
hourly basis?”230 In restating the question as it did, the court
appears to have left the focus of the inquiry on the dissolved law
228 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP (In re Heller Ehrman LLP),
830 F.3d 964, 965 (9th Cir. 2016).
229 Id. at 973.
230 Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, No. S236208, 2016 Cal.
LEXIS 7131, at *1 (Cal. Aug. 31, 2016).
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firm rather than on the obligations of the partners or
shareholders of the dissolved firm, which is where the focus
should be. This is one of the places where the district court in
Heller Ehrman became confused. Again, it is critical to recall that
the former Heller shareholders who relocated their practices to
the defendant law firms continued to owe duties to each other
and to Heller. To the extent the defendant law firms believe that
focusing on the individual shareholders penalizes them for
finishing Heller’s business, they need to reconsider. Under
RUPA, which California adopted after Jewel, they are entitled to
reasonable compensation for their work on unfinished matters.
It is difficult to criticize the California Supreme Court before
it even hears the case, but the question presented might have
been better restated along these lines: Must shareholders or
partners of a dissolved law firm who transfer hourly matters that
were open at the time of dissolution from their former law firm to
a new law firm account to their former firm for the profits earned
on those matters consistent with their obligation to wind up the
dissolved firm’s affairs? Restating the question that way clearly
would have focused attention on the obligations of the former
Heller shareholders.
IV. RECOGNIZING THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS DOCTRINE
The unfinished business doctrine is imperfect. It is a nagging
inconvenience for law firms. It potentially produces results in
some cases that perhaps are not “the most equitable or logical.”231
This is particularly true in jurisdictions that follow the UPA and
consequently
prohibit
partners
from
receiving
extra
compensation for their efforts in winding up partnership
affairs.232 This is the strict Jewel rule, or the “no compensation”
rule.233 Fortunately, the seeming unfairness of the ban on extra
compensation for time spent on winding up partnership affairs
that was enforced in Jewel is cured in states that have adopted
RUPA, and therefore permit lawyers who perform legal services
in the wind-up to receive reasonable compensation for
their efforts.234
At base, the unfinished business doctrine prioritizes
partners’ fiduciary duties to one another and the dissolved
Sufrin v. Hosier, 896 F. Supp. 766, 770 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(f) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1914)
(“No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business, except
that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for his services in winding
up the partnership affairs.”).
233 Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
234 See supra Part II.A.
231
232
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partnership over other competing considerations.235 It is on these
duties that courts must focus. Courts should appreciate the
importance of fiduciary duties between partners and between
partners and their firms, and they ought to recognize the value in
upholding those duties at times when relationships between
partners are tested. To the extent the unfinished business
doctrine further emphasizes the financial interests of creditors of
the dissolved law firm over those of the firms to which the
partners of the dissolved firm relocate, that is a simple
policy choice.
The unfinished business doctrine is an established aspect of
partnership law that applies to all businesses organized as
partnerships, including professional practices. Why should law
firms be treated differently from other partnerships in connection
with matters where they bill by the hour? There is no good
answer to this question.236 The recycled argument that the
unfinished business doctrine is unworthy of enforcement because
it impairs client choice does not hold water.
Lawyers making this argument contend that applying the
unfinished business doctrine to matters billed by the hour creates
a financial disincentive for the former partners of a dissolved
firm to continue representing their clients when they transition
to their new firms.237 That is, when a partner realizes that she
and her new colleagues will have to perform all of the ongoing
work but will have to remit a material share of the associated
fees to her former firm, she will opt to terminate the
representation even though the client may want her to
continue.238 But as explained earlier, the true value that a
partner brings to her new law firm generally is not pending
matters in their own right, but the client relationship and the
expectation of significant future matters from that client.
Withdrawal from current matters out of frustration with the
unfinished business doctrine would destroy the real asset at
issue to the detriment of the lawyers and their new law firms. It
is almost certainly for this reason that this claimed risk has
never been shown to have occurred.239
Sufrin, 896 F. Supp. at 770.
The unfinished business doctrine certainly applies to contingent fee matters. See,
e.g., Santalucia v. Sebright Transp., Inc., 232 F.3d 293, 297–98 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Shandell v. Katz, 629 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 (App. Div. 1995)). Indeed, lawyers generally
accept the doctrine’s application in that context.
237 Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP, 480 B.R. 145,
170 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d in part, vacated in part, In re Coudert Bros., 574 F. App’x 15
(2d Cir. 2014).
238 Id.
239 Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 13.
235
236
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Not surprisingly, courts presented with client choice
arguments have repeatedly rejected them.240 Some courts have
specifically noted the speculative “sky is falling” nature of these
arguments.241 As the Colorado Supreme Court aptly observed in
LaFond v. Sweeney,242 “[h]ypothetical harm, as opposed to actual
harm to the client’s ability to choose counsel in [a] case, is not a
pertinent consideration when determining the rights and
obligations of attorneys to their firms.”243
For that matter, a variety of factors may deter or prevent a
client from following a lawyer from a dissolving firm to another
firm.244 A conflict of interest may prevent the lawyer from
representing the client at the second firm, or the client may find
the second firm’s fee structure unacceptable and therefore seek
different representation.245 Lawyers who depart dissolving law
firms for new firms have no obligation to ensure that their new
firms are acceptable to their existing clients.246
Another common argument against the unfinished business
doctrine in the law firm context asserts that because clients are
not property and belong to no lawyer247 and can discharge their
lawyers at any time for any reason or for no reason at all,248 their
open matters cannot fairly be characterized as property of the
dissolved firm. But this argument is unsupportable. First, it
ignores the fact that the subject clients had not discharged the

240 See, e.g., Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he right of
a client to the attorney of one’s choice and the rights and duties as between partners with
respect to income from unfinished business are distinct and do not offend one another.
Once the client’s fee is paid to an attorney, it is of no concern to the client how that fee is
allocated among the attorney and his or her former partners.”); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485
N.E.2d 413, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“This right of the client is distinct from and does not
conflict with the rights and duties of the partners between themselves with respect to
profits from unfinished partnership business because since, once the fee is paid to an
attorney, it is of no concern to the client how the fee is distributed among the attorney
and his partners.”).
241 See, e.g., In re LaBrum & Doak, LLP, 227 B.R. 391, 409 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998)
(“Although the Defendants bluster about the allegedly disastrous public policy of such
principles, they are unable to cite any cases from any jurisdictions regarding law firms to
the contrary.”).
242 LaFond v. Sweeney, 343 P.3d 939 (Colo. 2013).
243 Id. at 947.
244 Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 13.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 See Phil Watson, P.C. v. Peterson, 650 N.W.2d 562, 565 n.1 (Iowa 2002) (“[C]lients
do not ‘belong’ to [a] firm or its individual members . . . .”); Shamberg, Johnson
& Bergman, Chtd. v. Oliver, 220 P.3d 333, 341 (Kan. 2009) (“A client is not an article of
property in which a lawyer can claim a proprietary interest, which he can sell to other
lawyers expecting to be compensated for the loss of a property right.”) (quoting Palmer
v. Breyfogle, 535 P.2d 955, 966 (Kan. 1975)).
248 Nabi v. Sells, 892 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (App. Div. 2009); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.16 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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dissolved firm and, indeed, followed their lawyers to their new
firms. Second, although the dissolved law firm may not have an
enforceable property interest in the client’s matter, it does have
an enforceable property interest in the proceeds from its lawyers’
work.249 In undertaking work for a client, a partner commits that
those fees will flow to the firm and be shared among the partners
according to the partnership agreement, or in the absence of a
partnership agreement, pursuant to the jurisdiction’s partnership
law.250 Third, the new law firms wanted the dissolved law firm’s
partners to join them precisely because they would transfer their
clients. The relocating lawyers surely promoted their client
relationships when negotiating their moves to their new firms.
The lawyers and their new firms cannot fairly disclaim the
unfinished business doctrine on client choice principles even as
they are counting on client loyalty to obtain financial benefits.
The best argument against the unfinished business doctrine
is that it must not be worth enforcing because it can be so easily
waived. Phrased as a question, if a law firm can circumvent the
unfinished business doctrine simply by inserting a Jewel waiver
in its partnership agreement, what value is there in enforcing the
doctrine in the absence of such a waiver? The answer, it would
seem, is either “none” or “not much.”
As sensible and appealing as this argument is, it is unlikely
to carry the day. The trouble is its flipside: a law firm is a
sophisticated organization with the ability to avoid the
unfinished business doctrine by drafting its partnership
agreement accordingly. A treatise on law firm partnerships even
offers a sample Jewel waiver for lawyers to use when drafting or
amending their partnership agreements.251 In short, a firm that
chooses not to include a Jewel waiver in its partnership
agreement effectively consents to governance at dissolution by
default partnership law and thus submits to application of the
unfinished business doctrine.252 Furthermore, the unfinished
business doctrine’s status as a default rule does not make it
undeserving of recognition or enforcement. If that were the case,
every jurisdiction would have to abandon its partnership
statutes. After all, the UPA and RUPA primarily set
default rules.253
Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 14.
Id. (citing Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485 N.E.2d 413, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)).
CORWIN & CIAMPI, supra note 41, § 6.03[7], at 6-40.4.
252 See Rutledge & McGuire, supra note 22, at 9.
253 Husch & Eppenberger, LLC v. Eisenberg, 213 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Mo. Ct. App.
2006); McCormick v. Brevig, 96 P.3d 697, 703 (Mont. 2004); Ederer v. Gursky, 881 N.E.2d
204, 212 (N.Y. 2007); Bushard v. Reisman, 800 N.W.2d 373, 381 (Wis. 2011); see, e.g.,
HILLMAN ET AL., REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 56, § 103(a) (“To the extent the
249
250
251

Do Not Delete

318

6/20/17 7:13 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 20:2

V. CONCLUSION
Law firm failures are disturbingly common. Even brand
name law firms collapse with odd frequency. Regardless of the
particular firm or reasons for dissolution, failed law firms
typically have open client matters. This triggers application of
the unfinished business doctrine, which is an entrenched aspect
of partnership law. Under the unfinished business doctrine,
absent an agreement to the contrary, partners have a duty to
account to the dissolved firm and their former partners for either
all fees or profits generated from work in progress at the time of
the firm’s dissolution in accordance with their percentage
interests in the dissolved firm.
For years, courts have applied the unfinished business
doctrine to all client matters, including those billed by the hour.
There seemed to be no doubt that the unfinished business
doctrine applied to hourly matters just as it did to contingent fee
cases. Then, in 2014, two courts upset the applecart when they
rejected the doctrine’s application to client matters that are billed
hourly. In Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP),254
New York’s highest court held that “pending hourly fee matters
are not partnership ‘property’ or ‘unfinished business’ within the
meaning of New York’s Partnership Law.”255 In Heller Ehrman
LLP v. Davis, Wright, Tremaine LLP,256 a California federal court
reasoned that California law was “unsettled on the question of
whether a law firm may assert a property interest in hourly fee
matters pending at the time of its dissolution,”257 and held that
equity and public policy weighed against recognition of the
unfinished business doctrine in that context.258 The losing
bankruptcy trustee appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the case
has now reached the California Supreme Court on a certified
question from the Ninth Circuit. The California Supreme Court’s
decision will determine the outcome in Heller Ehrman.
In re Thelen and Heller Ehrman were wrongly decided. The
principal arguments against the unfinished business doctrine
that have been made to date are unpersuasive. But if the
California Supreme Court holding compels the Ninth Circuit to
affirm the district court’s decision in Heller Ehrman, it will be
fair to wonder whether the unfinished business doctrine will
partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the
partners and between the partners and the partnership.”).
254 20 N.E.3d 264 (N.Y. 2014).
255 Id. at 266–67.
256 527 B.R. 24 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
257 Id. at 30.
258 Id. at 30–33.
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survive in jurisdictions other than California and New York. It is
hard to have any confidence that other courts will reject the
reasoning of courts as influential as the New York Court of
Appeals and the California Supreme Court, regardless of the
strength of any contrary arguments.
None of this is to say that the unfinished business doctrine is
perfect or that it does not yield results in some cases that appear
unfair to the lawyers involved. But the unfinished business
doctrine is a default rule that lawyers can contract around. And
whatever unfairness lawyers claim is arguably matched by the
unfairness that creditors of the dissolved law firm will feel if the
doctrine is abrogated in the hourly fee context. Insofar as law
firms that hire lawyers from dissolved law firms go, operation of
the unfinished business doctrine is simply a cost of doing
business. If they want the client relationships that relocating
lawyers are able to deliver, they need to be prepared to either
(a) share the fees generated by open matters that are transferred
to them; or (b) negotiate some preferable resolution with the
dissolved firm’s administrator or trustee. Recent experience
teaches that law firms can settle unfinished business claims for
pennies on the dollar.
In contrast, abrogating the unfinished business doctrine in
connection with law firms’ hourly representations may come at a
cost. For example, it is fair to worry that courts’ rejection of the
doctrine may lessen some companies’ willingness to do business
with law firms or will cause them to insist on terms that are
disadvantageous to law firms. More broadly, exempting law firms
from the doctrine’s operation in connection with matters billed by
the hour risks creating the impression that courts are favoring
lawyers over other partnerships that remain subject to the
doctrine.259 The appearance of such self-interest is potentially
corrosive to the legal profession.
In conclusion, partnership law requires courts to apply the
unfinished business doctrine to client matters that law firms bill
by the hour. The California Supreme Court in Heller Ehrman
should so hold to be consistent with the state’s lower appellate
courts that have long done so. This is the correct result as a
matter of partnership law, even if it is unpopular with lawyers
and law firms.
259 See generally Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of
the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 454–55 (2008) (stating the hypothesis, later
said to be established, that “if there is a clear advantage or disadvantage to the legal
profession in any given question of law, the cases are easy to predict: judges will choose
the route (within the bounds of precedent and seemliness) that benefits the profession as
a whole”).
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